For years, Donald Trump and his supporters have insisted that they are victims of "lawfare." The term originally referred to the misuse of legal institutions as political weapons. In the MAGA lexicon, however, the word has been transformed into a catch-all label for any criminal investigation or prosecution that inconveniences Trump or his allies.
This inversion of language obscures an important distinction. A criminal prosecution based upon evidence of actual wrongdoing is not lawfare. It is the ordinary functioning of the justice system. By contrast, using the machinery of government to investigate, threaten, or prosecute political opponents who have committed no crime is precisely what lawfare is supposed to mean.
The prosecutions arising out of the January 6, 2021 attack on the United States Capitol illustrate the difference. Participants forcibly entered the Capitol, assaulted police officers, damaged property, and disrupted the constitutional process by which Congress certifies presidential election results. Many defendants were identified through video recordings, social-media postings, eyewitness testimony, and other evidence. They were charged with violations of established criminal statutes and were afforded the protections guaranteed by the Constitution: counsel, due process, jury trials, and appeals. Calling such prosecutions "lawfare" requires ignoring the underlying conduct.
The same is true of prosecutions involving efforts to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election. Prosecutors alleged that certain individuals participated in schemes involving fraudulent elector certificates, obstruction of official proceedings, and other actions intended to substitute political will for lawful electoral outcomes. Whether every charge was ultimately proven is less important than the fact that the investigations were based upon identifiable conduct that, if established, would constitute violations of criminal law. The existence of political implications does not transform a criminal prosecution into lawfare. Many crimes committed by public officials inevitably have political consequences.
Yet allegations of politically retaliatory prosecution also have arisen during the second Trump administration. Former FBI Director James Comey and New York Attorney General Letitia James, for example, have argued that federal prosecutions brought against them were retaliatory. Reporting has noted Trump's public demands for action against both, the reluctance of the predecessor prosecutor to bring charges, and the subsequent indictments obtained after Lindsey Halligan became interim United States Attorney. The Justice Department disputes the retaliation claims and has continued seeking to revive the prosecutions. Reuters, September 15, 2026. These disputes illustrate why the label "lawfare" should turn on evidence about purpose, selectivity, and legal merit rather than on the political identity of the accused.
Political commentators such as Thom Hartmann have argued that a hallmark of authoritarian movements is the misuse of governmental power against perceived enemies. Hartmann has repeatedly warned that authoritarian systems seek to intimidate critics, punish dissenters, and transform law-enforcement institutions into instruments of personal or political loyalty rather than impartial justice. He points to efforts to target political opponents, journalists, government officials, and other critics not because they have violated the law, but because they are inconvenient to those in power.
If a government launches investigations for the purpose of harassing opponents, if it seeks prosecutions unsupported by evidence of criminal conduct, or if it selectively applies the law based upon political allegiance, that is far closer to the traditional meaning of lawfare. The presence of evidence that a person committed an offense does not by itself dispose of the question: selective or retaliatory enforcement can remain abusive if similarly situated allies are spared, opponents are singled out because of protected political activity, or prosecutorial power is used for an impermissible retaliatory purpose. Such conduct undermines public confidence in the justice system because it communicates that legal institutions exist not to enforce the law equally, but to reward friends and punish enemies.
History teaches that authoritarian movements frequently blur the distinction between legitimate law enforcement and political persecution. Supporters are taught that their leaders are innocent victims regardless of the evidence, while critics are portrayed as criminals regardless of the absence of evidence. The result is a world in which objective facts become secondary to political identity.
The irony is difficult to miss. Many of the same voices that describe the prosecution of January 6 rioters as lawfare enthusiastically support the use of governmental power against political adversaries. Under that view, prosecution of one's allies is illegitimate by definition, while investigation of one's opponents is justified by definition. Such reasoning abandons the rule of law altogether.
A healthy democracy requires a consistent principle. Political identity should neither immunize a suspect nor make the suspect a target. Credible evidence that a person violated the law is necessary to justify prosecution, but it is not always sufficient to answer a claim of selective or retaliatory enforcement. The relevant questions can also include whether comparable cases are treated alike and whether governmental power is being exercised for a legitimate law-enforcement purpose rather than to punish political opposition.
The real danger is not that criminals are prosecuted. The real danger is that citizens become unable—or unwilling—to distinguish between prosecution based on evidence and prosecution based on politics. When every lawful prosecution is dismissed as lawfare, genuine abuses become harder to recognize. The term loses its meaning precisely when society most needs it.
Lawfare is a real threat. Its defining feature is not simply whether some underlying conduct can be alleged; it is the misuse of legal power for an illegitimate political purpose. Conversely, the fact that a defendant is politically prominent does not convert an evidence-based, evenhandedly pursued prosecution into lawfare. Preserving that distinction is essential if the rule of law is to survive.