In an opinion piece published August 18, 2026, in The New York Times, Professor Michael J. Bustamante argues that Cuba has entered an exceptionally severe phase of its long-running economic and political crisis, with ordinary Cubans bearing the consequences of both the government’s failures and intensifying U.S. pressure. Since the pandemic, and especially since the Trump administration imposed what Bustamante describes as a de facto oil blockade in January 2026, shortages of food, medicine, electricity and other necessities have become extreme. Cubans now spend much of daily life simply waiting for basic needs to be met.
Several possible outcomes are being discussed. Some Cuban exiles anticipate a collapse of Communist rule comparable to Eastern Europe in 1989. Earlier in 2026, however, Trump administration officials reportedly explored an accommodation under which some Communist officials might remain in power if Havana liberalized its economy, freed political prisoners and severed security relationships with U.S. adversaries. Those talks apparently went nowhere, and Washington subsequently intensified secondary sanctions, causing foreign companies to leave Cuba.
The mounting hardship has produced increasingly visible public anger, including pot-banging protests and street blockades. Cuban officials themselves appear worried about a possible “social explosion.” Bustamante nevertheless cautions against assuming that economic desperation will topple the regime. Unlike Eastern Europe in 1989, Cuba has so far shown neither serious fractures within its ruling establishment nor a sufficiently organized opposition. The security apparatus remains intact, while mass emigration has provided an alternative to mass political mobilization.
A second possibility is American intervention. The administration has increasingly portrayed Cuba as a national-security threat because of its relationships with China, Russia and Iran. Bustamante warns that intervention could evoke the historical precedent of the American occupation beginning in 1898. Although another outright occupation appears unlikely, he worries that American economic and political domination could follow military action, particularly if U.S. companies acquired distressed Cuban assets and Washington effectively chose or worked through a compliant new leadership.
Bustamante considers all these dramatic scenarios less likely in the immediate future than continued stalemate. Havana has little incentive to accept American demands that could mean the regime’s own destruction, while Washington faces serious risks from military escalation, including another costly reconstruction effort and domestic political repercussions.
His central conclusion is therefore grim: the Cuban and American governments may be able to continue their strategic “push and pull” indefinitely, but ordinary Cubans cannot. Political leaders can wait for the other side to concede; people struggling for food, medicine, electricity and viable futures do not have that luxury.